link to class schedule

1.  Overview old introduction

Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2012): Why Nations Fail, Crown Business.
Besley, T. and T. Persson (2007), "The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics"
Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (1997): "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?"
Ehrlick, I. and F. Lui (2000): "Bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth," Journal of Political Economy
Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2004): "Do Institutions Cause Growth" Journal of economic Growth 9: 271-303.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001): "Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution," No. w8460. National bureau of economic research.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2000): "The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation," No. w7771. National bureau of economic research.

2. Voter Turnout

Palfrey, T. and H. Rosenthal [1985]: "Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty," American Political Science Review
Levine, D. K. and T. R. Palfrey [2007]: "The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study," American Political Science Review, 101: 143-158
Feddersen, T. J. and A.Sandroni [2006]: "A theory of participation in elections," American Economic Review
Coate, S. and M. Conline (2004): "A group rule: Utilitarian approach to voter turnout: Theory and evidence" AER
Coate, S., M. Conlin and A. Moro (2008): "The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referenda" Journal of Public Economics
TJ Feddersen, T. J. and W. Pesendorfer (1996): "The swing voter's curse," American economic review
Levine, D. K. and A. Mattozzi [2015]: "Voter Participation with Collusive Parties"

3. Lobbying and Group Size Lobbying versus Voting

Becker, G. S. (1983): "A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371-400.
Acemoglu, Daron (2001): "Inefficient redistribution", American Political Science Review 95: 649-661.
Hillman, A. L. and J. G. Riley (1989) "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers" Economics and Politics
Esteban, J. and D. Ray (2001): "Collective action and the group size paradox," American Political Science Association 3: 663-672.
Ades, A. and R. DiTella (2002): "The new economics of corruption: a survey and some new results," Political Studies.
Dixit, Avinash (2004): Lawlessness and Economics, Princeton University Press
Austen-Smith, David and J. R. Wright (1992): "Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote," Social Choice and Welfare.
Becker, Gary S. (1985): "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs", Journal of Public Economics.
Becker, Gary S. and Casey B. Mulligan (1998): "Deadweight costs and the size of government," NBER.
Becker, Gary S. (1986): "The Public Interest Hypothesis Revisited: A New Test of Peltzman's Theory of Regulation", Public Choice 49: 223-234.
Boadway, R. and M. Keen (2000): "Redistribution," Handbook of income Distribution.
Damania, R., P. G. Frederiksson and M. Mani (2004): "The persistence of corruption and regulatory compliance failures: Theory and evidence," Public Choice.
Slinko, Irina, Evgeny Yakovlev, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2005), "Laws for sale: evidence from Russia," American Law and Economics Review 7.1: 284-318.
Levine, D. K. and S. Modica [2016]: "Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations"

4. Enforcement in Groups

Levine, David K., and Salvatore Modica (2013): "Peer Discipline Incentives Within Groups"
Kandori, Michihiro (1992): "Social norms and community enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies
Shapiro, Carl and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1984): "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device", American Economic Review 74: 433-444
Border, Kim C. and Joel Sobel (1987): "Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder", The Review of Economic Studies Vol. 54, pp. 525-540
Di Porto, Edoardo, Nicola Persico and Nicolas Sahuguet (2013): "Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing", American Economic Journal: Micro
Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1999): "Political economy, information and incentives," European Economic Review.
Ostrom, Elinor (1990): Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker and Roy Gardner (1992): "Covenants with and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible", The American Political Science Review (86)
Banks, Jeffrey S. and Barry R. Weingast (1992): "The political control of bureaucracies under asymmetric information," American Journal of Political Science

5. Games Between Collusive Groups

Dutta, R., D. K. Levine and S. Modica (2016): "Collusion Constrained Equilibrium"
Olson, Mancur (1965): The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Esteban, J. and J. Sakovics (2003): "Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict," Theory and Decision, Springer 55: 339-357.
Dixit, Avinash, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1997): "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making", Journal of Political Economy

link to first problem set
link to second problem set
link to third problem set