This course will cover topics of interest in economic theory and
mathematical economics, with particular emphasis on topics in game
theory and mechanism design. A selection of both background and
contemporary material will be covered, though the focus of the course
will be on the instructors' current research. Plenty of research
opportunities will be discussed. Details of the course may be
found on the
outline.
The readings corresponding to Ergin's lectures can be found listed on the outline, and will be posted there as available. The
readings corresponding to Levine's lectures are online and can be found
by clicking on "Bibliography" on the outline. The books are
on
reserve in the library.
This will be a lecture course. The course requirement is a paper,
although with the permission of the instructors a take-home final exam
may be substituted for the paper. There will be 4-5 problems sets that
you are strongly encouraged to do. Answer sheets will be made available
and the answers discussed at problem sessions out of class hours. You are also encouraged to make an optional oral presentation.
Preparation
Those students who have taken Economics 511 or a course in mathematical
analysis have an adequate mathematics background for our topics.
Students who wish to write dissertations in economic theory should take
as many mathematics courses as possible: 4111, 4121, 417, 418, 451,
452, 5051, 5052.
Be advised that this course is about economic theory (see the title)
and will employ relatively advanced mathematics. This is not
a
required course, so if you do not like economic theory or you do not
like mathematics, you should consider taking a different
course.
The purpose is not to give students a taste of theory (this was done in
503-504), but rather to prepare students to write dissertations in
economic theory.
Textbooks
1. Osborne and Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1994. [Primary]
2. Fudenberg and Tirole, Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1991. [Supplementary]
3. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, The Princeton University Press, 1998. [Supplementary]
4. Mailath and Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-run Relationships, Oxford University Press, 2007. [Supplementary]